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CASES NOTED
ARMED SERVICES
READY RESERVE - ENLISTMENT CONTRACT - Morse v. Boswell, 289 F.
Supp. 812 (D. Md.), stay denied, 393 U.S. 802 (1968).- Petitioners
were 113 members of the United States Army Reserve who had enlisted
prior to the effective date of Pub. L. No. 89-687, § 101(e) (Oct. 15,
1968). Under authority of this law the President ordered petitioners' Ready
Reserve unit to 24 months of active duty. The court rejected the conten-
tion that retroactive application of Pub. L. No. 89-687 abridged petitioners'
contract with the government. Petitioners' enlistment agreements incorpo-
rated all laws in effect at the time of enlistment including the provisions
of 10 U.S.C. §§ 262-63, 672-73 (1964). In denying petitioners' request
for habeas corpus relief the court stated that Pub. L. No. 89-687 imple-
mented and was in furtherance of those sections.
. By its action the court established the proposition that entire reserve
units may be activated under authority of legislation enacted subsequent to
the enlistment of the members of the unit. This case adds to a growing
line of authority enabling Congress to activate reservists by retroactive ap-
plication of its legislation.
COMMON CARRIERS
RAIL - DEFINITION IN TERMS OF EXTENT OF OPERATIONS - Ciaccio v. New
Orleans Public Belt R.R., 285 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. La. 1968).- Plaintiff, an
employee of Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., was injured while moving a rail-
road car onto his employer's wharf. The plaintiff sued Lykes Brothers and
the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad who had moved the car to the wharf.
Lykes Brothers sought summary judgment, alleging that they were not com-
mon carriers by rail as required under the Federal Employers Liability Act,
45 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The court granted the motion, holding that Lykes
could not be included within the scope of the act because of the small size
of their rail system and because they did not hold themeselves out to the
public as ready to transport goods for hire by rail.
The case clarifies the ruling in Lone Star Steel Co. v. McGee, 380 F.2d
640 (5th Cir. 1967), that to be a common carrier by rail a company must
be a part of an interstate rail system, either through common ownership or
through a contractual relationship with an interstate railroad.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAv
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AN'D FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE - Honohan v. Holt,
17 Ohio Misc. 57, 244 N.E.2d 537 (C.P. 1968).- Plaintiff alleged that
an Ohio statute enacted in 1965 to provide free transportation for all school
children, whether attending public, private, or religious institutions, vio-
lated the establishment clause of the first amendment. Although a similar
New Jersey statute had been upheld against such constitutional attack in
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), plaintiffs argued that
Everson no longer represented current constitutional interpretation of the
issue. The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas rejected this argu-
ment, citing Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), to estab-
lish the continued doctrinal vitality of Everson. The court further ruled
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that the bussing provision did not violate Ohio's constitutional interdiction
against public "support [of] any place of worship," reasoning that the in-
cidence of the benefits was too "indirect" to constitute support. The court
indicated that Ohio's constitutional provision may be less restrictive than
first amendment requirements.
The decision is consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court and
the courts of a growing number of state jurisdictions. In addition, the
case suggests that additional "indirect" assistance to Ohio parochial schools,
such as a textbook "loan" program patterned after the one initiated in New
York, would not be offensive to either the Ohio or Federal constitutions.
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
SERVICE - MODE AND SUFFICIENCY - Scher v. HMH Publishing Co.,
289 F. Supp. 917 (D. Conn. 1968).- In a diversity action for breach of
contract, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The defendant corporation maintained no office or agents in Connecticut
and relied instead on circulation of its Playboy Magazine to solicit promo-
tional offers from local retailers. The negotiation and acceptance of the
contract in issue took place in Illinois. In denying the motion to dismiss,
the district court held that application of the Connecticut long-arm statute
to a contract performed within the forum state was not unconstitutional
under the minimum contacts test of due process.
While noting that the mere making of a contract to be performed in the
forum state is not sufficient minimum contact, the district court rejected the
defendant's contention that lack of physical contact with Connecticut was
controlling. The court emphasized the continuing relationship with the
forum state created by circulation of the national magazine, whereby the
defendant solicited responses to promotional offers. This decision follows
the recent movement away from a bias favoring defendants toward one re-
quiring defendant to come to the plaintiff, when sufficient basis exists for
having him do so.
INSURANCE
EXTENT OF COVERAGE - ARBITRATION - Flood v. County Mutual Ins.
Co., 41 IMI. 2d 91, 242 N.E.2d 149 (1968).- Plaintiff was the owner
of a standard automobile insurance policy providing compensation for
bodily injury arising out of an accident with an uninsured motorist and
which contained a mandatory arbitration clause effective in case of disagree-
ment between the insured and the insurer as to either liability or the extent
of damages. Pursuant to the provisions of the policy, plaintiff sought dam-
ages from the insurer for the death of his son, arising out of a collision with
an allegedly uninsured vehicle. The insurer disputed coverage and the in-
sured demanded arbitration. Upon the arbitrator's ruling that coverage
questions were within his power, the defendant sought to stay the proceed-
ings until a court determined the issue. The Illinois Supreme Court, in re-
versing the denial of the stay by the lower courts, held that the arbitration
clause did not relate to the issue of coverage, reasoning that the clause re-
ferred only to disputes of liability and amount of damages and could not by
implication be extended to encompass all disputes between the insured and
insurer.
By holding that such arbitration clauses must be construed narrowly, the
court took a position consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have
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emphasized that parties must arbitrate only those issues which they have ex-
plicitly agreed to arbitrate.
INTERNAL REVENUE
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX - DETERMINATION OF LIABILITY - New
England Wooden Ware v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 111 (D. Mass.
1968).- Plaintiff brought this action to recover income taxes assessed on
accumulated earnings under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 531-37. Plaintiff
contended that it had allowed funds to accumulate instead of dividing and
distributing them not for purposes of tax avoidance, but for expansion and
diversification of its faltering business. After an extensive review of the
corporation's history and prospects, the court held that its specific and defi-
nite plans for expansion warranted the accumulation of earnings for rea-
sonably anticipated business needs. The court took special note of the fact
that plaintiff had hired a well-known business consulting firm to explore
avenues for expansion and diversification and had reached the stage of pro-
ducing test samples and studying market potential and production feasibil-
ity for the proposed products.
This court followed the usual pattern in accumulated earnings cases of
basing its conclusions on a close analysis of the particular business facts,
rather than on the application of any general formula.
CARRIED INTEREST - DEDUCTIONS AND DEPLETION ALLOWANCE -
United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1968).- Defendant sought
a deduction and depletion allowance for a sum of money used by his co-
partner to pay taxpayer's share of the cost of an oil operation. Pursuant to a
contract taxpayer's co-partner had agreed to pay and remain personally liable
for all the costs of the operation in return for the right to reduce from tax-
payer's share of the income a proportional share of taxpayer's cost of the
operation. The Tax Court in upholding Cocke's contention that he had a
right to the deduction relied on Commissioner v. Abercrombie, 162 F.2d
338 (5th Cir. 1947), in which it was held that the individual who has title to
monies from producing oil property is entitled to the deduction and de-
pletion allowance from the operational costs.
The court of appeals reversed the Tax Court, holding that the one who
incurs the actual loss can avail himself of the deduction. Since Cocke had
invested nothing in the cost of the operation, he could have no basis upon
which to claim the deduction, or depletion allowance. This decision is con-
sistent with decisions of the second and ninth circuits.
MINERAL DEPOSITS - ORDINARY INCOME - United States v. White, 401
F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1968).- Taxpayers conveyed their uranium mine by
warranty deed retaining a 10 percent royalty interest. The government
treated the proceeds of the sale as ordinary income. Appellees paid the tax
and filed for a refund which the district court allowed in part, giving the
proceeds of the sale capital gains treatment. The circuit court reversed,
holding that when the entire transaction was examined, the absence of a total
price plus appellees' continued participation in the endeavor compelled the
same treatment given oil and gas holdings.
The decision represents an extension of ordinary income plus deple-
tion allowance treatment to mineral properties. The more significant im-
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port, however, may come from the circuit court's theory that there is no
logical ground for distinction between mineral and oil/gas properties.
Such a belief could mean the termination of tax treatment by the kind of
natural resource involved and result in more uniform tax policy.
MASTER AND SERVANT
FELA ACTIONS - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - Mills v. Pennsylvania
N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 16 Ohio St. 2d 97, 243 N.E.2d 99 (1968).-
Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured when he fell in defendant's railroad
yard. His state court action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964), was withdrawn from the jury, and the de-
fendant's demurrer to the evidence was sustained. The court of appeals
affirmed. Reversing the lower courts, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
under recent United States Supreme Court decisions holding that proof of
the slightest employer negligence would sustain a jury case in FELA actions,
the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to reach the jury. However,
the Ohio court emphasized its disapproval of the liberal federal rule, which
it said imposed liabilities never intended by Congress.
This case indicates that the Ohio Supreme Court has finally yielded to
Supreme Court precedent on the minimal evidence necessary for a jury
case in FELA actions. This decision was a marked departure for the Ohio
court, whose restrictive FELA decisions have been reversed by the Su-
preme Court three times in the past 12 years.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
TORTS - IMMUNITY - Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160
N.W.2d 805 (1968).- Plaintiff was injured when his motor vehicle was
struck by a police car. The defendant demurred to plaintiff's complaint
asserting its sovereign immunity. On appeal, the court reversed holding
that the plaintiff had stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against the city of Omaha. In so concluding, the court rejected the defense
of sovereign immunity relying heavily on the theory that private interests
should not be subordinated to the municipal weal when a government agent
has been negligent.
In casting aside the sovereign immunity defense, the court reasoned it
not only had the responsibility to reform the doctrine which had beenjudicially created, but that in the absence of legislative preemption or
action to the contrary, it had the power to abrogate the rule. The decision
represents a continuation of the trend rejecting the sovereign immunity
doctrine, and in addition it suggests that court's have the power to amend
common law rules which are no longer justified by sound reason.
PATENT LAW
COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS - WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Loshbough v. Allen, C.C.P.A -....-- 160 U.S.P.Q. 204 (1969).-
Appellant petitioned the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to issue a
writ of mandamus directing the Board of Patent Interferences to suspend
proceedings in an interference and to grant the parties an opportunity to be
heard on the questions of patentability and priority of invention. The
court in denying the petition held that the writ was neither necessary or ap-
propriate in aid of the court's jurisdiction in the priority appeal since the
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appeal priority is a controversy subject to normal appellate review proce-
dures.
The most significant aspect of the decision lies not in the denial of the
petition, but rather in the determination of the court that it could, in an ap-
propriate situation, issue a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a) (1964). The position is consistent with the view expressed in
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), that the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals is an article III constitutional court vested with full
judicial powers, including the power to issue all writs necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction.
SUBJECTS OF PATENTS - PATENTABILITY OF A MENTAL PROCESS -
In re Prater, ____ C.C.P.A. , 159 U.S.P.Q. 583 (1968), petition for
rehearing granted, C.C.P.A .... 160 U.S.P.Q. 230 (1969).-
Appellants, inventors of an apparatus and process to facilitate the spec-
trographic analysis of gaseous mixtures, failed to convince the Patent Office
that their invention was patentable. The patent application, disclosing an
analog computer program and a series of complex mathematical equations,
was rejected as being a claim to a "mental process." The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, however, reversed the Patent Board and held that the
appellants' patent application should not be rejected because it could alterna-
tively be carried out by mental steps. In allowing appellants' patent, the
court gave its approval to the patentability of conventional digital computer
programs. This new legal precedent, however, does not help resolve the
more critical practical problems of how to handle the multitude of computer
program applications that will soon confront the Patent Office.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE - COVERAGE OF INTENTIONAL CRIMINAL CON-
DUCT - Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968).- Mrs. Zipkin
sued defendant Freeman, a psychiatrist, alleging that during the course of
psychiatric therapy, the defendant caused Mrs. Zipkin to fall in love with
him, to leave her husband and to become his mistress, to give him money, to
file spurious law suits against her husband and brother, to steal her hus-
band's property at gunpoint, and to attend nude swimming parties. The
doctor's insurer refused to defend the suit or to pay the resulting $17,000
damage award, contending that Freeman's conduct was outside the scope of
his malpractice insurance policy. The Missouri Supreme Court held the in-
surer liable, reasoning that the plaintiff's injuries were directly and proxi-
mately caused by the psychiatrist's mishandling of accepted psychiatric tech-
niques.
Although in line with the trend to construe vague insurance policies
against the insurer, this decision seems to thwart public policy considera-
tions by allowing the defendant to pass on to an insurer liability for inten-
tional, criminal conduct only tangentially related to his profession.
PROCEDURE
PERSONAL DISABILITIES AND PRIVILEGES - CONVICTION OR IMPRISON-
MENT FOR CRIME - Grasso v. McDonough Power Equip. Inc., 264 Cal.
App. 2d 723, -_ __P.2d . , 70 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1968).- Plaintiff, a
life prisoner whose civil rights had been partially restored, brought a per-
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sonal injury suit to which defendant demurred claiming that the 1-year
statute of limitations barred the action. Appealing the order sustaining
the demurrer, plaintiff asserted that the statute had tolled because of her
incarceration during the 10 years between her injury and commencement
of the action. Reversing the order, the court of appeals liberally construed
the tolling statute which literally permits tolling only for prisoners serving
a term of years.
The court indicated that the modern life sentence often results in less
actual incarceration than the term of years so that the eradication of the
life prisoner's rights imposed by the tolling statute is no longer cogent. In
so holding the California court has set an example for other courts to
liberally interpret tolling statutes to reflect modem rehabilitative practices.
SELECTIVE SERVICE
CIVILIAN WORK IN LIEU OF MILITARY SERVICE - QUESTIONS FOR THE
JURY - Elizarraraz v. United States, 400 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1968).-
Having classified the registrant I-0 (conscientious objector), his local draft
board offered the registrant three types of civilian work in lieu of military
service. In response, the registrant declared that his religion did not permit
him to perform such work. Two years later upon being directed to report
to a state hospital to perform civilian work, the registrant reported as di-
rected but refused to sign an employment form required of all hospital
employees. After leaving the hospital without performing any work, the
registrant was convicted of knowingly failing, neglecting, and refusing to
perform the duty required under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967,
§§ 6(j), 12(a), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 456(j), 462(a) (1968). In affirm-
ing the conviction, the court held that based on the evidence in the re-
cord, the jury could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the registrant's
refusal to fill in the employment form was a pretext in furtherance of his
previous declaration not to do civilian work required of conscientious ob-
jectors. Although the dissenting justice made a forceful argument that the
application contained an unconstitutional loyalty oath, the holding of the
majority follows the firmly established rule of requiring the jury to make
findings as to questions of pure fact.
SHIPPING
STEVEDORE COMPANY's DUTY TO INDEMNIFY SHIPOWNER FOR COMPANY
EMPLOYEE'S INJURY - RELIANCE AS A DEFENSE - International Termi-
nal Operating Co. v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik Stoomv. Maats., 393 U.S. 74
(1968) (per curiam).- A longshoreman, employed by International Ter-
minal Operating Co. (ITO), suffered injuries as a result of carbon monoxide
inhalation while working in the hold of defendant's ship. Defendant soughti demnification from ITO for an amount of damages equal to that recovered
by the longshoreman on the theory that ITO had the duty to insure the
safety of its workmen, and that it had failed to initiate the necessary meas-
ures to effectuate that end. The stevedore company asserted in defense that
an officer of the defendant ship had promised to activate the ship's "cargo-
caire" ventilation system to remove the monoxide fumes from the hold. The
court of appeals in reversing the district court decision for ITO reasoned that
to exonerate ITO, the shipowner's conduct must prevent or seriously handi-
cap the stevedore company's ability to provide safe working conditions.
Such was not the case of ITO because it could have utilized its own blowers
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to clear the air or have immediately ordered its men out of the ship's cargo
hold. The Supreme Court in reversing and reinstating the verdict of the
trial court held that reasonable reliance by ITO upon the promise of the
ship's officer was sufficient to exculpate the stevedore company.
The case reaffirms the holding of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1955), that the stevedore company's obligation to
the shipowner to unload a vessel in a "workmanlike manner" is founded
upon contract, not tort, and may thus be altered by agreement between the
parties.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
BILLS AND NOTES - GOOD FAITH - HIMC Investment Co. v. Siciliano,
103 N.J. Super. 27, 246 A.2d 502 (1968).- In an action to recover
on a legally deficient note for a second mortgage that was purchased
from another finance company, the plaintiff failed to allege his good faith
at the time of the transaction. In ruling for the defendant the court held
that without plaintiff's allegation, his claim of being a holder in due course
was insufficient under UCC § 3-302 and N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:3-302
(1962). Recognizing a strong implication of collusion between another
finance company, the payee loan company and the plaintiff, the court also
concluded that the circumstances of the instant case indicated that the
plaintiff had actual knowledge (rather than mere suspicion) of the note's
legal deficiencies when the transaction occurred. This case is consistent
with the language of section 3-302 which requires that in order for a party
to qualify as a holder in due course, he must allege his good faith in ac-
cepting a deficient note.
WARRANTIES - SERVICES - Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J. Super.
279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968).- Plaintiff brought suit for breach of warranty
for injuries to her scalp and loss of hair following a permanent wave treat-
ment at defendant's beauty parlor. Defendant argued that plaintiff had
no cause of action for breach of warranty because the transaction primarily
involved the sale of a service and did not come under the sale of goods re-
quirement of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Citing
comment 2 of UCC § 2-313, the court held that implied warranties are
not restricted to "sales" that fall within the meaning of article 2 of the
UCC but that the same policy reasons supporting liability for breach of
warranty in the sale of goods justify the extension of liability to other com-
mercial transactions. In so ruling the New Jersey court followed the re-
cent trend in that jurisdiction to reason by analogy from the UCC and to
apply similar warranty principles to commercial transactions not exclusively
confined to the sale of goods.
